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4.  Raging Debate 
 
This briefing note examines the major 
trends  on  Chinese  trade  and 
investment  on  the  African  continent. 
The  note  also  gives  some  general 
political economy context for China‘s 
economic engagement with Africa.  
 




1.1    Whereas  Chinese-African 
economic  relations  span  several 
hundred  years,  modern  economic 
relations date back to the late 1950s 
when  China  signed  the  first  official 
bilateral trade agreement with Algeria, 
Egypt,  Guinea,  Morocco  and  Sudan. 
Chinese-African economic relations at 
that  time  often  reflected  China‘s 
political  geopolitical  considerations, 
and thus its foreign policy. 
 
1.2  Today,  China‘s  global  economic 
strategy  is  largely  shaped  by  its 
national  development  objectives  and 
its  demand  for  energy  and  other 
resource. Its relations with Africa fall 
within this context. Indeed, China has 
been  adjusting  its  policy  toward 
Africa since the 1990s when its own 
post-Mao  economic  reforms  initiated 
by  the  late  Deng  Xiaoping  had 
matured, and when its leaders decided 
to  usher  in  a  Chinese  African 
relationship  based  on  more 
comprehensive  cooperation  than 
ideology and foreign policy. 
 
 
1.3  Nonetheless,  official  Chinese 
economic engagement with Africa still 
stresses  two  key  political  still  stresses 
two key political considerations: First, a 
quid  pro  quo  recognition  of  Taiwan 
(Chinese Taipei) as an integral part of 
China;  and  second,  adherence  to  the 
official  principals  of  engagement,  i.e., 
equality  among  partners,  mutual 
benefit, respect for sovereignty, use of 
interest-free  grants  and  loans, 
beneficiary  capacity  building, 
compliance with obligations, provision 
of equipment made in China and same 
living conditions for both Chinese and 
local  experts  (Larkin,  1971, 
Chaponnière, 2009). 
 
1.4  In  general,  official  Chinese 
economic  activities  in  Africa  are 
structured  on  a  bilateral  basis,  with 
discussions being held between China‘s 
central  government  and  its  African 
counterparts.  It  is  in  this  context  for 
example,  that  several  Chinese  state-
owned  banks  have  devoted  their 
operations to backing China‘s presence 
in  Africa.  However,  official  China‘s 
presence in Africa is not only confined 
to  the  Chinese  central  government‘s 
activities.  An  increasing  number  of 
Chinese  local  governments  often  act 
independently  of  the  central 
government  in  establishing  economic 
(and other) engagements across Africa; 
mainly  through  the  firms  they  own 
(Chen and Jian, 2009). 
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“…a significant portion 
of Chinese-African 
economic activity 
involves a broad range 
of other actors, notably, 
multinationals, small 
and medium-sized 










1.5  However, a significant portion of 
Chinese-African  economic  activity 
involves a broad range of other actors, 
notably,  multinationals,  small  and 
medium-sized businesses, traders, and 
even  individual  Chinese  migrants 
increasingly  seeking  better  economic 
fortunes on the continent. To be sure, 
each  of  these  varied  state  and  non-
state actors have diverse strategies in 




2. Major Trends in Chinese-
African Trade 
 
2.1  China‘s  emergence  as  a  major 
trading partner for Africa is likely to 
continue  to  grow.  It  is  obvious  that 
even  though  European  countries  still 
remain  Africa‘s  leading  partners, 
things  are  gradually  changing  (see 
Figures 1 and 2). 
 
Figure 1: Distribution of African Exports among the Major Blocs (1994-2009) 
 















































































Figure  1  indicates  that  the  share  of 
African exports to European countries 
is on the decline, in spite of a rebound 
since 2006. China‘s share, in contrast, 
continues  to  grow,  partly  outpacing 
some  other  Asian  countries,  which 
was due to the drop in Japan‘s share. 
 
 
Figure 2 indicates that with regards to 
African  imports,  the  weight  of  the 
United  States  continued  to  grow  even 
as  Europe‘s  dropped.  It  is  very  likely 
the growth in imports from China will 
continue  to  increase  while  those  from 
traditional markets in the United States 




“It is very likely the 
growth in imports from 
China will continue to 
increase while those 
from traditional 
markets in the United 
States and Europe will 
remain either stable or 
decline.”  
   
2.2 However, it should also be emphasized that 
from China‘s perspective, China-Africa trade is 
still relatively modest (see Figure 3). Indeed, 
China-Africa trade comprises only 4 percent of 
the total Chinese imports and exports. 
However, the most striking is that from an 
African  perspective  China-Africa  trade 
growth  is  more  important  as  it  represents 
close  to  10  percent  of  the  continent‘s 
exports and imports. 
 
Figure 2: Distribution of African Imports among the Major Blocs (1994-2009)  
 















































































Figure 3: Africa’s Share in Total Chinese Exports and Imports 
 
 




















   
   
 
 
2.3  Disaggregation of the China-Africa trade reveals 
that Africa‘s trade with China is highly concentrated 
with only a few countries on the continent (see Figures 
4 and 5). Both figures indicate that around 60 percent 
of Chinese exports are destined for just six 
 
 
countries:  South  Africa  (21%),  Egypt  (12%),  Nigeria 
(10%),  Algeria  (7%),  Morocco  (6%)  and  Benin  (5%) 
while 70 percent of Chinese imports originate from four 
countries:  Angola  (34%),  South  Africa  (20%),  Sudan 
(11%) and Republic of Congo (8%). 
Figure 4: High Concentration of Chinese Exports to Africa (2007)        Figure 5: High Concentration of Chinese Imports from Africa (2007) 
 
 
                        





2.4  However, the high concentration of China-Africa 
trade is not just by country, but also by sector (see 
Figure  6).    Approximately  70  percent  of  registered 
African exports to China consist of crude oil and 15 
percent  of  raw  materials.  This  specialization  is 
accompanied by a very strong dependence of certain 
countries, since nearly 100 percent of Angola‘s and 
Sudan‘s exports are made up of crude oil. Compared 




exports  have  a  modest share even  though they  often 
constitute  the  bulk  of  export  of  several  African 
countries. This has also been confirmed by research of 
a  number  of  sub-Saharan  African  countries  which 
shows  that  there  is  an  imbalance  between  Chinese 









   
 
 
   
Figure 6: Africa’s Exports to China by Product, 2007 
 
 


































































































































































































































































2.5    On  the  other  hand,  African  imports  from  China  are 
relatively  more  diversified  although  three  major  types  of 
products  are  still  dominant:  machinery  and  transport 
equipment, manufactured goods and handicrafts (Figure 7). 
Chemicals  and  food  products  account  for  less  than  10 
percent  of  the  total.  In  general,  Chinese  products  are 
considered  to  be  well  suited  to  African  demand. 
Manufactured goods imports – electronic toys, textiles, etc 
–  have  allowed  Africans  to  expand  their  range  of 
consumer  products.  Prices  are  often  relatively  low, 
making the products accessible to a larger number of 
people. Machinery and transport  equipment imports 
are linked to the strong presence of Chinese firms in 
the  infrastructure  sector,  specifically  in 
telecommunications,  road  construction  and 
construction of numerous public buildings. 



































































































































































































































































   
 
   
2.6  Africa‘s imports from and exports to China can further 
be disaggregated by country (see Figures 8 and 9). Figure 
8  suggests  that  the  structure  of  imports  from  China  is 
rather similar among leading African trading partners, with 
machinery,  transport  equipment  as  well  as 
manufactured  products  always  carrying  significant 
weight. 
 








































































































2.7  In addition, Figure 9 indicates that African exports 
to China are not very diversified, with the exception of 
South Africa. The most evident are the exports of 
Angola and Sudan which highlight the importance 
of commodity exports. 
 
Figure 9: Key African Exports by Country and by Product 
 
































     
 
2.8  The analysis could also be extended to 
include the overall trade balance. Figure 10 
 
summarizes  the  large  discrepancy  in 
balance  of  trade  between  China  and 
various African countries.  
   
















































































































































































2.9  Figure 10 shows that in 2008, the total 
bilateral  trade  was  USD  114  billion  of 
which USD 52 billion consisted of exports 
by  Africa  to  China  and  USD  62  billion 
imports by Africa from China. This means 
that on a whole Africa has a trade deficit of 
USD 10 billion.  However, there are large 
discrepancies  between  African  countries. 
Large  oil  exporters  such  as  Angola  and 
Sudan,  have  a  large  surplus,  while  most 
non-oil  producers  have  a  negative  trade 
balance.  The  exceptions  are  Algeria  and 
Nigeria,  which  are  oil  and  gas  exporting 
countries  but  still  have  a  negative  trade 
balance with China. 
 
3.  Major Trends in China’s 
Investment in Africa 
 
3.1 China‘s FDI in Africa is closely linked 
to its trade and development assistance on 
the continent. Although marginal in terms 
of China‘s total outward FDI flows (0.2% 
in 1991 and 9.8% in 2008) and total FDI 
received  by  Africa  from  the  rest  of  the 
world  (6%  in  2008),  there  have  been 
substantial increases in volume in the last 
10 years, coupled with expanded Chinese-
African  trade  (Kaplinsky  and  Morris, 




Chinese Ministry of Commerce, China‘s 
FDI in Africa has increased yearly by an 
average  of  46  percent  over  the  last 
decade.  The  stock  stood  at  USD  7.80 
billion  in  2008  compared  to  USD  56 
million in 1996.  During the first three 
quarters of 2009, Chinese FDI flows into 
Africa  amounted  to  $875  million, 
posting an increase of 78.6 percent year-
on-year. 
 
3.2    It  should  be  noted  however  that 
there are wide discrepancies in the FDI 
statistics,  depending  on  the  source.  In 
addition, Chinese investments are often 
channeled  through  off-shore  entities 
registered in places such as Hong Kong, 
Cayman Island and others. Furthermore, 
the  statistics  are  relatively  scarce  at 
sectoral level. Similar to trade patterns, 
the destinations of China‘s outward FDI 
flows  and  stock  into  Africa  are 
dominated  by  a  few  resource-rich 
countries (see Figure 11). 
 
 
“Large oil exporters 
such as Angola and 
Sudan, have a large 
surplus, while most 
non-oil producers have 
a negative trade 
balance with China.” 
“Chinese investments 
are often channeled 
through off-shore 
entities registered in 
places such as Hong 








   
 
   
Figure 11: Destinations of China’s FDI Flows into Africa (2003-2008) 
 
 
Source: Chinese Commerce Ministry, 2008 
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3.3  The  main  recipients  of  Chinese 
investments for the period 2003-2008 were 
South  Africa  (64%),  Nigeria  (9%),  Sudan 
Zambia  (5%),  Algeria  (5%)  and  Sudan 
(4%).  The  position  taken  by  Nigeria,  the 
leading oil producer of sub-Sahara Africa, 
reflects the Chinese strategy in recent years 
of seeking energy independence. It weighed 
much  less  in  2003.  According  to  the 
Financial Times, China National Offshore 
Oil  Company  (CNOOC),  a  State-owned 
enterprise  and  one  of  the  three  major 
energy players in China, is negotiating with 
Nigeria, to acquire one sixth of the rights to 
the latter‘s oil reserves.
1 
 
3.4  Chinese  enterprises  investing  in 
strategic  sectors  such  as  oil,  ores  or 
infrastructure  are  mostly  state-owned 
and/or subsidized with Chinese grants or by 
state-owned banks. These enterprises often 
manage  large  investment  projects 
(Kaplinsky and Morris, 2009). For instance, 
the state-owned China National Petroleum 
Corp (SNP) is the leading foreign investor 
in Sudan. SNP is controlled either by the 
central or local government in China (Chen 
and Jian, 2009).  
 
3.5  Chinese  investments  in  Africa  by 
medium-  to  large-sized  enterprises  are 
found  mainly  in  the  manufactured  goods, 
telecommunications and wholesale trade  
 
sectors while small firms are dominant 
in  the  light  industry  and  retail  sectors. 
Although  the  SMEs  certainly  play  an 
important  role  and  are  present  in  most 
African countries, they are not properly 
captured in official statistics. 
 
3.6  In  2006,  the  main  FDI  flows 
involved  the  mining  sector  (40.74%), 
business  services  (21.58%),  finance 
(16.4%),  transport  and 
telecommunications  (6.57%),  wholesale 
and  retail  trade  (6.57%)  and 
manufactured  goods  (4.33%),  with  the 
other  sectors  being  only  slightly 
represented.  For  instance,  agriculture, 
forestry and fisheries attracted less than 
1% of Chinese FDI (Kiggundu, 2008). In 
terms  of  stocks,  the  three  leading 
investors  in  Africa are  State-owned  oil 
companies: China Petrochemical Corp., 
China  National  Petroleum  Corp.  and 
China  National  Offshore  Oil  Corp. 
(Kiggundu,  2008).  The  case  of 
infrastructure  is  particularly  important 
because  the  sector  is  a  key  driver  of 
economic  growth.  Historically,  it  was 
one of the first sectors in which China 
invested  in  Africa.  Over  35  African 
countries  are  engaged  with  China  in 
infrastructure  financing  arrangements 
and  the  largest  recipients  are  Nigeria, 
Angola, Sudan and Ethiopia (see Figures 
12 and 13). 
1 Burgis Tom, ―Chinese Seek Huge Stake in Nigeria Oil‖, Financial Times 29 September 2009. 
 
“The main recipients of 
Chinese investments 
for the period 2003-
2007 were Nigeria 
(20.2%), South Africa 
(19.8%), Sudan 
(12.3%), Algeria (12%) 
and Zambia.” 
“Chinese enterprises 
investing in strategic 
sectors such as oil, ores 
or infrastructure are 
mostly state-owned 
and/or subsidized with 








      Figure12: China’s Financial Commitments in Infrastructure Projects in Major Recipient Countries (2001-2007) 
 
 





















Figure 13: Confirmed Chinese Infrastructure Financing  
in Sub-Saharan Africa per Country (2001-2007) 
 
           





















3.7  Commitments  to  Africa  rose  from  USD  1  billion 
annually  between  2001  and  2003  to  USD  1.5  billion 
between 2004 and 2005, and reached USD 7.5 billion in 
2006.    For  instance,  China  financed  10  hydroelectric 
power  projects in  2007  to  the  tune  of  USD  3.3  billion. 
These projects combined have allowed Africa to increase 
its hydroelectric power production capacity by 30%. With 
respect  to  financing  road  and  railway  network  projects, 
China has financed USD 4 billion worth of investments, 
including the rehabilitation of existing railway lines and 
the construction of new lines. 
 
3.8  The  main  beneficiaries  of  such  projects  are 
Nigeria,  Gabon  and  Mauritania.  China‘s  role  in 
Africa‘s  infrastructure  sector  is  highly  visible;  in 
particular  as  this  sector  suffers  from  a  large  deficit 
whereas it is critical to its economic development and 
African  integration,  in  particular  for  landlocked 
countries.  The  Africa  Infrastructure  Diagnostic 
(AICD)  study  estimated  that  Africa  needs  USD  93 
billion per year to address the deficit in this sector. 
China has also developed industries and competitive 
services  with  special  expertise  in  the  execution  of 
public  works,  which  is  based  on  constructing  large 








   
    3.9  Besides  physical  infrastructure, 
Information  and  Communication 
Technologies (ICT) is also part of China‘s 
increasing  involvement  in  Africa‘s 
infrastructure. China‘s contribution to this 
sector in Africa generally takes the form of 
equipment  supply  to  national  firms. 
Ethiopia,  Sudan  and  Ghana  are  major 
beneficiaries and China has supplied nearly 
USD  3  billion  into  this  sector  on  the 
continent.  
 
3.10   China‘s increasing direct investment 
in  manufacturing  in  Africa  is  largely 
through  industrial  parks  or  special 
economic zones (SEZs). This approach was 
formally  initiated  in  2006  when  China 
committed  to  establish  five  zones  across 
Africa,  and  later  in  2007,  committed  to 
establish a further five zones. A number of 
projected zones have been announced and 
are currently at differing stages of progress 
and are expected to focus on value-added 
industries  (Edinger,  2008),  including  in 
Ethiopia,  Mauritius,  Nigeria  (two), 
Tanzania, Zambia, Botswana, Sierra Leone, 
and Egypt. The special economic zones are 
expected to make a significant contribution 
to industrialization in Africa although their 
success  is  by  no  means  guaranteed. 
Meeting the objectives of both China and 
African  countries  will  require  an  active 
partnership  and  a  framework  for 
collaboration  that  includes  engagement 
from  host  governments,  processes  for 
phasing-in  local  control,  communication 
and enforcement of standards, and support 
for integration with local economies. 
 
3.11 Although close China-Africa trade and 
investments  links  will  continue  for  the 
foreseeable  future,  several  notable  trends 
are  emerging.  First,  there  seems  to  be  an 
increasing emphasis on the private sector as 
well  as  on  small  and  medium  size 
enterprises  (SMEs)  in  sectors  such  as 
telecommunications, business services and 
manufactured  goods  Kapinski  and  Morris 
(2009).  Kapinski  and  Morris  stress  that 
with  the  exception  of  SME  in  search  of 
quick,  short-term  profit.  Second,  Chinese 
firms are generally less averse to risk than 
their  Western  counterparts.  Chinese 
companies are not necessarily constrained  
by environmental and social safeguards, 
for  example.  Third,  Chinese  firms  also 
use some African countries as a platform 
for re-exports, particularly in the apparel 
industry,  which  is  notably  relevant  for 
those countries that are part of privileged 
trade  arrangements  such  as  the 
―Everything but Arms Agreement‖ of the 
European  Union  and  the  ―American 
Growth  and  Opportunity  Act‖  of  the 
United States. 
 
3.12 In general, the structure of Chinese 
FDI  seems  very  different  from  that  of 
Western countries which mostly involves 
private  investors  with  notable  limits  to 
their  risk  appetite  and  which  are  often 
not committed to long term presence in 
Africa  (Besada  et  al.,  2008).  On  the 
contrary,  Chinese  investments  today 
suggest  the  intention  of  establishing 
long-term  relationships,  at  least  with 
governments.  
 
3.13 Nonetheless, China‘s trade does not 
seem  to  be  geared  towards  a  purely 
African  strategy.  Its  main  features  are 
consistent  with  China‘s  general  policy, 
which  is  aimed  at  lessening  its  energy 
and  other  natural  resource  constraints 
and  increasing  outlets  for  its 
manufactured products. Whether in trade 
or investment, this Chinese presence in 
Africa  is  bound  to  rise.  Consequently, 
the growth in Chinese investments across 
Africa  is  of  particular  interest  to 
policymakers as it will invariably affect 
the  continent‘s  economic  growth, 
poverty  reduction,  employment,  and 
perhaps  even  its  environment  and 
governance. 
 
4.    Raging Debate 
 
4.1  China‘s  increased  engagement  with 
Africa  has  sparked  a  raging  debate  in 
development circles. On the one hand are 
those who believe that that engagement, 
particularly,  China‘s  rising  demand  for 
Africa‘s natural resources, has not only 
helped to re-establish Africa as a source 
of  valuable  commodities  for  the  global 
market, but also, has helped to focus  
“China’s increasing 
direct investment in 
manufacturing in 
Africa is largely 
through industrial 
parks or special 
economic zones 
(SEZs).” 
“Chinese firms are 
generally less averse to 
risk than their Western 
counterparts. Chinese 
companies are not 
necessarily constrained 








   
 
attention on why the continent still remains 
poor and new possibilities for breaking out 
of that poverty.  
 
4.2  On  the  other  hand  are  voices  that 
believe that China‘s increased engagement 
with Africa is no different from earlier ones 
which largely cast Africa as the supplier of 
cheap but abundant raw materials as well as  
 
 
a market for cheap manufactures. These 
latter  voices—mostly  (but  not 
exclusively  Western)—also  tend  to 
suggest that African countries engaging 
with  a  Chinese  government  that  skirts 
political interference have little incentive 
to improve governance. 
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“On one side China’s 
rising demand for 
Africa’s natural 
resources, has not only 
helped to re-establish 
Africa as a source of 
valuable commodities 
for the global market, 
but also, has helped to 
focus attention on why 
the continent still 
remains poor and new 
possibilities for 
breaking out of that 
poverty .” 
“On the other side, 
African countries 
engaging with a 
Chinese government 
that skirts political 
interference have little 
incentive to improve 
governance.” 